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INTRODUCTION
The organization of government in the Commonwealth of Australia has
been described as the '''Washminster' Mutation.,,2 Australia was formed as a
Federation of six British colonies in 1901, which were recognized as states
from that point, perpetuating Westminster systems of responsible government.3
However, in general, Australia's Founding Fathers w~re also enamored with
the United States' political institutions, and so the Federation brought a U.S.
federal structure to the country, including a written and rigid Constitution, a
federal-or "Commonwealth"-Parliament with an U.S.-inspired Senate, and
judicial review of legis1ation.4 The Federal Constitution also reproduced
provisions of the U.S. Constitution that were thought relevant to federal
arrangements, even though the founding fathers were unsure how those
provisions might be important to the regular working of the federation.5 These
Washrninster mutations are evident in the constitutional position of religious
freedom, which embodies a mixture of U.S.-style religion clauses, older British
I U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report Submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Arnor,
Special Rapporteur, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/23: Addendum: Visit
to Australia, '1107, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1998/6/Add.l (Sept 4, 1997) (prepared by Abdelfattah Amor)
[hereinafter U.N. Report]. The report described Australia's experience in the area of religious diversity as an
''unfinished experiment." 1d.
• Reader in Law, Centre for Public, International & Comparative Law, T.e. Beirne School of Law,
University of Queensland. Thaoks are given to Chris Fadzel for research assistance in the preparation of this
article. Any views expressed in this article are, of course, the author's own.
2 Elaine Thompson, The "Washminster" Mutation, in REsPONSffiLE GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA 32, 32
(Patrick Moray Weller & Dean Jaensch eds., 1980).
3 The six states of Australia are New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria,
and Western Australia. There are also Federal Territories, most of which are uninhabited or sparsely
populated. The three most populous Territories have delegated powers of self-government, and are the
Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, and Norfolk Island.
4 JOHNANDREwLANAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AusTRAL1AN CONSTmmON 128 (1972).
5 See Ausn.. CONST. §§ 116-18 (including religion in Section 116, privileges and immunities in Section
117, and full faith and credit in Section 118).
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traditions of parliamentary self-restraint, and statutory bills of rights, which are
more commonly used in the British Commonwealth today.6
In the development of Australian statutory bills of rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has determined the shape of
the rights adopted? The ICCPR and, to a lesser extent, the 1981 Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief (1981 U.N. Declaration), have been influential in law
reform proposals and legislative developments on religious equality in most
States and Territories.8
Part I of this Article explains the syncretic constitutional framework for
religious freedom, including the recent effect of the ICCPR on the
constitutional order. Part II deals with refonn proposals and other legislative
developments for assuring religious freedom and equality that draw directly on
the 1981 U.N. Declaration and the ICCPR. Parts I and II also address the
emerging problems of the "fit" within Australian law encountered by the
growing population of Muslim Australians. This question, as is the case
elsewhere in the Western World, is the most pressing for religious freedom and
equality now facing Australia. Part III therefore focuses on a prominent
method used to enforce tolerance of Muslims and other religious minorities-
anti-vilification or "group libel" laws-and the public and political controversy
they have generated. Lastly, the Article draws conclusions as to whether the
particular balance that Australian laws have struck between the freedoms and
equalities of the 1981 U.N. Declaration and the ICCPR has constructively
addressed the problem of Muslim integration, and whether it is an acceptable
balance for Australia's "unfinished experiment" in religious freedom.
1. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Federal Religion Clauses
The Federal Constitution has two proVlsIOns relating to religion that
together represent a compromise on the place of religion in Australian life
made at the time of federation. Neither has proved to be significant in
6 See infra text accompanying notes 9-92.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 92-134.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 145-221.
"
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constitutional adjudication, although the first, Section 116, has the greater
potential to shape legislation dealing with religion. Section 116 provides:
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion [Establishment Clause], or for imposing any religious
observance [Observance Clause], or for prohibiting the free exercise
of any religion [Free Exercise Clause], and no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the
Commonwealth.9 . ,
Cumulatively, these clauses are 1qlown as the Religion Clauses. It is
immediately apparent that this Section is indebted to the First Amendnient of
the U.S. Constitution, and to its Religious Test Clause. lO Only the Observance
Clause was a homegrown Australian addition to Section 116. These clauses
were' included in the Constitution as a counterweight to the second provision
that has a religious dimension.
The Preamble to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act states
that the people of the federating colonies were "humbly relying on the blessing
of Almighty God" in agreeing to unite. ll This phrase was included in the
Preamble after a concerted campaign by the Protestant churches, with
subsequent Catholic and Jewish support,12 and was sponsored specifically to
mark the Constitution with a permanent declaration of divine omnipotence.13
The Religion Clauses were therefore added to the Draft Constitution by the
Melbourne Convention in 1898 at the behest of the freethinker Henry Bournes
Higgins, who argued that the recognition of God in the Preamble might imply
that the Federal Parliament could legislate on religion, and that this should be
avoided.14 Sir Edmund Barton, later the ftrst Prime Minister of Australia,
made minor adjustments in the drafting stage, and the clauses became Section
116.15
The origins of the Religion Clauses betray little about the precise objectives
that the Founding Fathers hoped to achieve through them. This has not helped
9 AUSTL. CONST. § 116.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, pmbL (U.K).
12 See OFFICIAL.RECORD OiTIlE DEBATES OF TIlE AUS1RAI.AS1AN FEDERAL CONVENTION: 1iIIRD SESSION
1732-41 (1986) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORD]; RICHARD ELy, UN10 GOD AND CAESAR; RELIGIOUS ISSUES IN TIlE
EMERGING COMMONWEALTH 21, 24, 33-35, 38, 45,69-74 (1976); LANAUZE, supra note 4, at 128. Cf OFFICIAL
REPoRr OF TIlE NXI10NALAUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION DEBATES: ADELAIDE 1897, 1184-89 (1986).
13 OFFICIALRECORD, supra note 12, at 1733. .
14 ld. at 1770; ELy, supra note 12, at 76-79. 86.
15 See ELY, supra note 12, at I, 76--88; LANAUZE, supra note 4, at229.
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the High Court of Australia, the highest court of the land, articulate a
meaningful role for them in the Australian polity. If anything, the High Court
has made the clauses a "dead letter.,,16 Although the small effect of Section
116 owes much to its very structure, the particularly restrictive interpretation
of the Section's meaning is likely another Washminster mutation.
1. Structural Limitations
The principal reason for the narrow operation of Section 116 is that it
places no limitations on the States or, to the extent that they are delegated
powers to pass their own legislation, the Federal Territories. The terms of
Section 116 only place a prohibition on "the Comrnonwealth,,,17 which, as the
High -Court has read it, means the Federal Parliament.18 The Federal
Parliament has no power to legislate with respect to religion, as that power is
left to the States.19 Further, the accepted view has been that even under its
corporations power, the Federal Parliament is unable to regulate the activities
of religious corporations.20 The Australian Constitution has no provision
equivalent to the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, by which
restrictions placed on the federal government are incorporated as equivalent
restrictions applicable to the States?l
There is further uncertainty about the application of Section 116 to the .
Federal Territories. One early view was that when the Federal Parliament
directly legislated for a Territory, Section 116 might not even apply to the
legislation, although no reason'for this approach was given?2 However, the
16 KEITH MAsON, CONSTANCY AND CHANGE: MORAL AND REuGIOUS VALUES IN TIiE AUSTRAUAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 118 (1990); see also Michael Hogan, Separation of Church and State: Section -116 of the Constitution, 53
AusTL. Q. 214,226 (1981); N.K.F. O'Neill, Constitutional Human Rights in Australia, 17 FED. L. REv. 85, 118
(1987).
17 AUSTL. CaNST. § 116.
18 See Attorney-General of Victoria ex reL Black v. Commonwealth (State Aid) (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559
(Austl.).
19 See id.
20 AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xx); see also The Queen v. Fed. Court of A~stl. (1979) 143 c.L.R. 190, 234
(Austl.); Huddart Parker & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Moorehead (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330, 393 (Austl.). A recent expansive
reading of the corporations power might require this view to be revised. See New South Wales v.
Commonwealth [2006] H.C.A. 52, paras. 183-98 (Austl.).
21 See U.S. CaNST. amnd. XIV. Section 116has, however, been used occasionally to shape common law
principles that are dealt with in the exercise of State jurisdiction. See Nelan v. Downes (1917) 23 CLR. 546,
562 (Austl.); Canterbury Muo. Couocil v. MoslemAlawy Soc'y (1985) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 525, 544 (N.S.W.).
22 See State Aid, 146 C.L.R. at 594; Porter v. The King (1926) 37 C.L.R. 432, 448-49 (Austl.); Harry Gibbs,
Section 116 ofthe Constitution and the Territories ofthe Comnumwealth, 20 AUSTL. L.J. 375,375 (1947). Cf R D.
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more principled position is that Section 116 applies to federal legislation for
the government of the Territories.23 This was confrrn'led in Kruger v.
Commonwealth, which questioned the validity of federal legislation, applicable
only in the Northern Territory, which had authorized the removal of Aboriginal
children for placement in fosterage or institutional care?4 The legislation had
already been repealed, but the issue at the time of the challenge was its validity
before its repeal.25. A Free Exercise Clause challenge to this legislation was
brought to support a claim for damages, but failed?6
Nevertheless, a majority of the justices recognized that the Free Exercise
Clause could speak to legislation of this kind.27 In an obiter dictum, Justice
Gaudron, alone among the seven justices, also considered the different
q~estion of the potential application of the Free ~xercise Clause to legislation
passed by a Territory legislature in a self-governing Territory. She thought
that the Free Exercise Clause would be inapplicable to that kind of
legislation?8 The reason for this interpretation is unclear, as it means that the
federal Parliament can delegate to a Territory's legislature larger powers than
federal Parliament has itself. The effect, though, is that the self-governing
Territories are put in the same constitutional position as the States in their
ability to provide for, or compromise, religious freedom.
.2. The Jehovah's Witnesses Approach
Leaving the incontestable structural limitations in Section 116 to one side,
it is effectively the High Court's own interpretation of the provision that has
almost read it out of Australian constitutional law. The High Court made some
reference to the Religion Clauses in the 19l0s and 1920s29 but did not
genuinely attempt to expound their general effect until 1943 in the Jehovah's
Witnesses case?O In 1941, the Jehovah's Witnesses were banned under federal
Cumbrae-Stewart, Section 116 of the Constitution, 20 AuSTI.. LJ. 207, 208 (1946); Clifford Pannam, Section 116
and the Federal Territories, 35 AuSTL. L.J. 209, 209-10 (1961).
23 See State Aid, 146 C.L.R at 621,649; Tau v. Commonwealth (1969) 119 C.L.R. 564, 567,570 (AustI.);
Lamshed v. Lake (1958) 99 C.L.R.132, 143, 152, 154 (AustL).
24 (1997) 190 C.L.R. 1,73 (Austl.).
25 [d. at 33.
26 [d. at 40-41, 85-87, 122-23, 16~7.
27 [d.
28 !d. at 122-23.
29 Judd v. McKeon (1926) 38 CLR. 380, 387 (Austl.); Portet v. The King (1926) 37 C.L.R 432,448-49
(Austl.); Krygger v. Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366, 368-69 (Austl.); Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Attomey-
General (1912) 15 C.L.R 182, 195 (Austl.).
30 Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Commonwealth (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 131-33 (Austl.).
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national security regulations, by which the Government could declare a group
illegal if the group was thought prejudicial to the efficient prosecution of the
war.31 Among the consequences of a national security ban was that the
group's doctrines would become illegal, and they could not lawfully print or
publish their beliefs or hold meetings advocating them.32 On a number of
occasions, the Witnesses challenged the ban on the ground that it offended the
Free Exercise Clause.33
In the High Court proceedings, it was accepted that the Witnesses'
teachings, such as the belief that Satan ruled the world through organized
material agencies like the British Commonwealth, was prejudicial to the
national war effort.34 Ultimately, the High Court held that the ban on the
Witnesses was invalid and struck down the regulations?5 Strictly, there was
no need to consider the Free Exercise Clause, as the regulations were held to
be ultra vires, outside the scope of the parent National Security Act and, in
part, the Constitution's defense power.36 Justice Williams also held that the
Free Exercise Clause invalidated the regulation that made it illegal to print or
publi~h ''unlawful'' doctrines, or to hold meetings advocating them?7
However, this did not prevent the other justices from expounding on the
. scope of the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice Lathain's judgment, in
particular, represented the broadest interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,
which remained unchallenged for 40 years.38 First, the Chief Justice, along
with Justice Starke, relied on contemporaneous p.ecisions of the U.S. Suprem:e
Court to help defIne limitations to the protection of religion.39 These decisions
endorsed signifIcant rights for both individual choice and excesses in
religion.4o Second, the Chief Justice recognized that Section 116 dealt with
both the purpose and the effect of legislation. He held that, in considering
whether a law was "for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion" and so
invalid, "[t]he word 'for' shows that the purpose of the legislation in question
31 Id. at 118-20.
32 National Security (Subversive Organisations) Regulations, 1940, IT. 2, 3, 7-9, 11 (Austl.).
33 See Smith v. Handcock (1944) 44 WAL.R. 21, 23-24 (W. Austl.).
34 Jehovah's Witnesses, 67 C.L.R. at 117-18, 122.
35 Id. at 148, ISO, 156, 157, 168.
36 !d.
37 Id. at 164-65.
38 See generally id. at 122-34.
39 Id. at 128, 154--55.
40 Id.; see Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 u.s. 586,599 (1940), overruled by W. Va State Bd of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); Schneider v. Town of
Irvington, 308 U.s. 147, 160, 164 (1939).
1
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may properly be taken into account.,,41 This interpretation has led some to
suggest that the Chief Justice narrowed the reach of the Free Exercise Clause
to the purposes of federal legislation only.42 However, the Chief Justice made
no suggestion that the Free Exercise Clause restricted only legislative
purposes; to the contrary, the 'he and the rest of the Court in Jehovah's
Witnesses assumed that a facially-neutral regulation directed at the suppression
of subversive organizations, burdening religion in its effect, could offend the
Free Exercise Clause.43
Third, the High Court allowed for only the narrowest possible limitations
on religious freedom: those limitations that are required for the maintenance of
an organized political society and that' relate most directly to political and
social stability.44 Chief Justice Latham said that there could be no protection
of any liberty outside the continued existence of an organized society. He
concluded as follows:
It is consistent with the maintenance of religious liberty for the State
to restrain actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with
the maintenance of civil government or prejudicial to the continued
. f th . 45eXIstence 0 e commumty.
This limitation in Jehovah's Witnesses probably benefited from the decision's
concern with the operation of the defense power and issues that involve real
threats to the continued existence of the Australian Commonwealth. Although,
however .imprudently, the Witnesses conceded that their beliefs were
prejudicial to the Australian. war effort, the Court was unconvinced that they
presented any genuine threat to the nation's existence, even though the
decision was rendered at the height of the Pacific War.46
3. An Establishment Clause Mutation
The principal interpretive restriction on the Free Exercise Clause originated
in the High Court's first and only decision on the Establishment.Clause-the
41 Jehovah's Witnesses. 67 CL.R. at 132.
42 See PETER HANKs, CQNSTITIJTIONAL LAw IN AUSTRALIA 433 (1991).
43 Jehovah's Witnesses, 67 C.L.R. at 136, 147-48, 150, 155-56, 165.
44 See id. at 126, 129, 131-32, 149-50, 154-55, 157, 160.
45 Id..at 131. In a similar vein, Justice Mason later held that any denial of Commonwealth sovereignty is
inconsistent with a claim made under Section 116 of the same Constitution that establishes that sovereignty. Coo v.
Commonwealth (1979) 24 A.L.R. 118, 118 (Austl.).
46 Jehovah's Witnesses, 67 c.L.R. at 116.
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State Aid case in 1981.47 The case arose from a challenge to federa11egis1ation
providing for ["mandal assistance to private schools, which, in Australia, are
mainly religious and predominantly Catholic.48 A majority of the High Court
rejected the challenge, holding that the Establishment Clause only prohibited
the" Federal Parliament from passing legislation that purposefully created a
national church or religion.49 The State Aid decision is a genuine Washminster
mutation. Despite the Establishment Clause's clear descent from the First
Amendment, the majority rejected the use of U.S. precedents for its
interpretation.50 Given the public furor that often surrounded U.S.
Establishment Clause decisions, this rejection was almost inevitable.51
However, the majority also ignored a collection of decisions made in
Australian matrimonial courts that could be understood as responding to
imperatives of the Establishment Clause.52 Instead, to interpret the
- Establishment Clause, the High Court looked to English and Scottish cases of
the early twentieth century that, in different ways, had addressed the meaning
of "establishment.,,53
The broader consequences of State Aid, which would also direct the legal
understanding of the Free Exercise and Observance Clauses, stem from the
bloated significance that the Court gave to the word "for." This word is not
found in the U.S. First Amendment.54 The majority held that the law that
would be prohibited by the Establishment Clause in Section 116 would be a
law that deliberately intended the creation of a national church.55 But if a law
was intended for some other purpose and merely had the effect of creating
something like a national church, it would not violate the Establishment
Clause.56 That leaves little for the Establishment Clause to do. It only bans
something about which the Federal Parliament appears to have no positive
power to legislate-the creation of a national church.57 The interpretation of
47 Attorney-General ofVictoria ex reI. Black v. Commonwealth (State Aid) (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559 (Austl.).
48 Id. at 575.
49 Id. at 612,619,635,661.
50 Id. at 578-79, 598-99, 609-10, 615-16, 652-53.
51 Justice Murphy dissented on this point, although his use of U.S. Supreme Court precedent w';"
selective. See "id. at 622-23, 632-33; see also Reid Mortensen, Judicial (In)Activism in Australia's Secular
Commonwealth, 8(1) INTERFACE 52, 62-{i3, 65-{i6 (2005).
52 Mortensen, supra note 51, at 59--{)().
53 State Aid, 146 C.L.R. at 582, (fJ7, 616, 635, 653 (citing Gen. Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland
v. Lord Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (U.K.); Marshall v. Graham, [1907] 2K.B. 112, 116 (U.K.».
54 U.S. CONST. amend I.
55 State Aid, 146 C.L.R. at 579, 583-84, 604,615-16; 653.
56 Id.
57 See id.
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"for" in State Aid, however incompatible it seems with the High Court's
approach in Jehovah's Witnesses, further narrowed the operation of the Free
Exercise Clause.58 .
. 4. The Free Exercise Clause and the State Aid Mutation
.By extending the State Aid interpretation of the word "for" to the Free
Exercise Clause, it follows that if Parliament had the necessary secular purpose
it could validly and effectively prohibit the free exercise of any religion. The
Federal Court's decision in the Lebanese Moslem Association case supported
this extension.59 In this case, a judge set aside an order (made under federal
migration legislation) to deport the Imam of the Lakemba Mosque in Sydney.60
From the time of his arrival at the Mosque in 1982, the Imam quarreled
publicly with and litigated against other leaders of Muslim communities and
attracted security concerns by en40rsing suicide bombings in Lebanon.61 The
. deportation did not necessarily offend the Free Exercise Clause, but the
deportation order was held to be invalid because, in making the decision, the
G.overnment had not explicitly considered the free exercise implications of the
impact of the imam's deportation on the Lakemba Mosque.62
On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court set aside this decision.63
Justice Jackson adopted the State Aid view that the Religion Clauses controlled
only the governmental purpose.64 There was no deliberate intention to restrict
the practice of religion in the Mosque.65 Justice Jackson held that the
. restriction of free exercise was not the purpose, effect, or result of the
deportation, although indirectly it could have disrupted public worship in the
Lebanese Muslim community.66
The application of the State Aid interpretation of the word "for" to the Free
Exercise Clause was also subsequently adopted by the High Court itself in
Kruger v. Commonwealth.67 The gist of the free exercise claim in Krugerwas
that the removal of children from their tribal communities prevented them from
58 Mortensen, supra note 51, at 65.
59 See Lebanese MoslemAss'n v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1986) 67 AL.R 195 (AustI.).
60 Id. at 195.
61 Id. at 197-98.
62 Id. at 213.
63 Minister for hnmigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Lebanese Moslem Ass'n (1987) 71 AL.R. 578, 594 (AustI.).
64 See id. at 584-85.
65 [d. at 578.
66 Id. at 593--94.
67 (1997) 190 c.L.R. 1,40-45 (Anstl.).
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practicing their customary beliefs at sacred sites and on traditional lands.68
This claim· failed, and a significant reason for its failure was the State Aid
interpretation of the word "for." On this point, the majority of the Court
accepted Justice Gummow's view that "for" did not limit the Court to
assessing the Parliament's motives for passing legislation, but allowed it to
consider the objects or ends of the legislation.69 The Court suggested that, if
necessary, it might take extraneous considerations into account to detennine
whether the Parliament was using "a concealed means or circuitous device" to
escape the application of the Free Exercise Clause.7°
Although this is a slightly broader view of the Religion Clauses than was
taken in State Aid, it would not see the legislation struck down. According to
Justice Gummow, the legislation "no doubt may have had the effect" of
prohibiting the practice of the child's religion, but this was not its object.71
Here, Justice Gaudron dissented.72 Despite endorsing the majority view that
the Free Exercise Clause only restricted governmental purposes, Justice
Gaudron considered that the legislation prevented the child from participating
in religious tribal practices, and on that ground it should have been invalid.73
Kruger represents the current orthodoxy for the Australian Free Exercise
Clause. It roughly parallels the position that the U.S. Supreme Court
maintained in the early 1960s,74 which Justice Scalia adopted in 1990 in
Employment Division, Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith.75 The most.
significant difference with U.S. jurisprudence, however, remains that the
Religion Clauses have no application to the polities that, under the
Constitution, are most likely to legislate in ways that affect religious life-the
States and Territories.. Australia's Federal Constitution can only be altered if
68 Id. at 7, 13-14; see also Reid Mortensen. Interpreting a Sacred Landscape: Aboriginal Religion and
the Law in Australia in the I99Os. in RELIGION IN COMPARATIVE LAw AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY
281,285 (E. Caparros & L. Christians OOs., 2(00).
69 Kruger, 190 c.L.R. at 160-61.
70 Id. at 161.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 131-34.
73 Id.
74 See generally Braunfie1d v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606-D9 (1961) (holding that a PennsylVania criminal
statute proscribing Sunday retail sale of certain enumerated commodities did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 631 (1961) (holding that
Massachusetts' Sunday Closing Laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
75 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). Compare Smith with the position of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Big M
Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.CR. 295 (Can.) (holding the Lord's Day Act, which prohibited sale of goods on Sunday,
unconstitutional) and Ed~ards Books & Art Ltd. v. R., [~986] 2 S.CR. 713 (Can.) (upholding the Retail Business
Holidays Act, which prohibited Sunday retail sales).
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the amending bill is approved by a majority of the people voting in referendum
and a majority of the voters in a majority of the States.76 There have been two
attempts to extend the Religion Clauses to the States and Territories-in 1944
and 1988-and in both years the referendum failed. In 1988, the Catholic
bishops were concerned that the proposed change to Section 116 could have
led to a re-agitation of the question of government funding for private schools.
Along with the Federal Opposition's rejection of the proposal, the bishops'
intervention in the ref~rendum campaign was undoubtedly a significant reason
for why the Religion Clauses still bind only the Federal Parliament.77
B. The States and Territories
The failure of the 1988 referendum on the.Religion Clauses meant that, in
Kruger, Justice Gaudron could still note that "the States ... are completely
free to enact laws ... prohibiting the free exercise of religion ....,,78 She
therefore concluded that "[i]t makes no sense to speak of a constitutional right
to religious freedom in a context in which the. Constitution clearly postulates
iliat the States may enact laws in derogation of that right.,,79 Although States
usually do not do so, there are exceptions. There is a fundamental difference
between the Federal Constitution and State or Territory constitutional law-it
is unlikely that the States and Territories can provide for entrenched guarantees
of religious freedom that could not be comp.romised by the provisions of
ordinary legislation. State constitutions are generally flexible in the sense that
they can be amended by an ordinary act of the State Parliament.8o It is possible
to entrench some provisions in State constitutions by requiring some special
procedure, usually approval of a change to the provision by referendum, so
long as the entrenched provision concerns the constitution, powers or
procedures of the State Parliament.81
76 AUSTL. CaNST. § 128.
77 For some of the views presented in the campaign, see 162 PARL. DEB.• H. Rep. (1988) 376--77. 578-81
(Austl.); 128 PARL. DEB., Sen. (1988) 550-53 (Austl.); Richard Alston, The No Case. in THE CONSTTI1JTIONAL
COMMISSION AND THE 1988 REFERENDUMS 84, 101-m (Brian Galligan & J. R Nethercote eds., 1988); Frank
Brennan, The 1988 Referendum-A Lost Opportunity for an Australian Declaration on Religious Freedom, 69
AUSTRALASIAN CATH. REc. 205. 207, 215-16 (1992); Peter Reith, The No Case, AUSTL. L. NEWS, Aug. 1988. at 25.
78 Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR. 1, 125 (Austl.).
79 [d.; see Grace Bible Church, Inc. v. Reedman (1984) 54 A.L.R. 571, 582, 585 (S. Austl.). But cf.
Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement, Inc. v. South Australia'(1995) 64 S.A. St R. 551, 552, 554-57 (S. Austl.).
80 McCawley v. R., (1920] A.C. 691, 693 (U.K.).
81 See Colonial Laws Validity Act, l865, § 5 (U.K.); Australia Act, 1986, § 6 (U.K.).
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It seems unlikely that State bill of rights provisions could, in constitutional
terms, equate with the powers of the State Parliament.82 Consequently, even if
a State Parliament did attempt to entrench a religious freedom guarantee (and
none yet has) it probably still could be compromised by inconsistent provisions
of any subsequent, ordinary act of the State Parliament. Australian courts have
recognized that rights implied in State constitutions can be qualified by
ordinary legislation.83 .
For the self-governing Territories, the possibility of entrenching rights
encounters a different problem which springs from their political status as
creatures of the Federal Parliament.84 The Territory Constitutions are acts of
the Federal Parliament and can only be amended by that Parliament.85 This
means that rights could be entrenched in the Territories to the extent that the
Territory legislatures have no' power to amend their Constitutions or enact
legislation incompatible with them.86 However, no Territory Constitution
contains any bill of rights provisions, and moreover, unlike the State
Parliaments, the Territory legislatures could not add constitutional rights of
religious freedom to their constitUent documents.87
The result is that religious freedopl in Australia is secured principally by
the older British and colonial tradition of parliamentary self-restraint and a
political consciousness that government should not interfere in the religious
life of the people.s8 As other contribiltibns in this Symposium show, this
tradition has been superseded elsewhere in the British Commonwealth, with
the result that, with two exceptions; the polities of the Australian federation are
unique in the Western Wodd in resisting the introduction of comprehensive
bills of rights.89 Given the fundamental structures of Australian State and
Territory constitutional law, any bill of rights applicable to State or Territory
82 GERARD CARNEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE AUSTRAliAN STATES AND TERRITORIES 165
(2006).
83 Indep. Comm'n Against Corruption v. Comwan (1993) 38 N.S.WL.R. 207, 253 (N.S.W.); R. v.
Brisbane T.V. Ltd (1998) 2 Qd.R. 483,496 (Queensl.).
84 CARNEY, supra note 82, at 436.
85 Itt.
86 Id.
'07 Id. at 437--40,448-50,461-63.
88 See generally itt. at 29--34. .
89 Id. In the present volume, see Rex J. Ahdar, Religious liberty in a Temperate Zone: A Reponjrom
New Zealand, 21 EMORY !NT'L L. REv. 208, 214-15 (2007), and Peter Curoper, The United Kingdom and the
V.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 21
EMORY !NT'LL. REV. 13, 16-19(2007).
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law could only be of legislative status.90 Even if rights were embodied in the
Constitution Act itself, they could still be qualified by other legislation. For
this reason, the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998 and the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990 have been instrumental in modeling
statutory bills of rights for two Australian polities: the, Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) and Victoria91 Interestingly, it is also at this point that
international human rights instruments, especially the ICCPR, have been
important in shaping the rights that were introduced in these polities. There is
no constitutional or legal reason why. reference to international law should be
made for the States or Territories.92 The weight that has been given to the
ICCPR in developing these bills of rights may just reflect the interests and
expertise of their original author.
-1. Australian Capital Territory
In 2002, Jon Stanhope, the ACT Chief Minister, commissioned a
Consultative Committee to investigate the introduction of a bill of rights for
the Territory.93 The Consultative ComInittee, chaired by Professor Hilary
Charlesworth, one of the country's leading international law scholars,
recommended not only that a statutory bill of rights be introduced for the ACT,
but also that the rights it recognized be framed by reference to the ICCPR and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(lCESR).94 A bill of rights was thought worthwhile because the existing
protection of rights under· the combination of federal and Territory law,
constitutional law, common law and, possibly, international law applicable in
the ACT was "partial and haphazard" and therefore inadequate.95
There were certainly other bills of rights models available to the
Consultative Committee, especially from other countries in the
. Commonwealth, and there was opportunity to develop an autochthonous
scheme of rights.96 However, using international covenants to which Australia
was party was attractive for two reasons. First, there was already substantial
90 CARNEY, supra note 82, at 29-34.
91 Bill OF RIGIITS CONSULTATIVE COMM.• AUSTL. CAP. TERR., REpORT: TOWARDS AN ACf HUMAN
RIGHTS Acr 47-49 (2003) (hereinafter ACT REPoRT}.
92 There fillst be a particular reference to One of Australia's international obligations for the Federal
Parliament to introduce human rigbts legislation.
93 ACf REPORT, supra note 91, at 19.
94 Id. at 49.
95 Id. at 41.
96 Id. at 44-53.
- _.. _._-_._-------------,-------
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international jurisprudence available that could help to give more specificity to
the rights adopted without local adjudication on the rights.97 Second, there was
concern within the Territory that the federal government,' which bas refused to
explore the possibility of a federal bill of rights, may move to override the
Teqitory's adoption of a bill of rights-an action that is within the federal
Government's power in relation to the Territories.98
The Consultative Committee also considered that the implementation of
rights that gave effect to Australia's existing international obligations was less
likely to attract federal concern or grounds for irhervention.99 Accordingly, the
Human Rights Act was passed by the Territory legislature in 2004. The
legislature limited the rights adopted to civil and political rights and refused to
implement economic and social rights from both the ICCPR and the ICESR.
Section 14 of the Human Rights Act states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right includes-
(a) the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
or her choice; and
(b) the freedom to demonstrate his or her religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching, either
individually or as part of a community and whether in
public or private.
(2) No-one may be coerced in a way that would limit his or her
freedom to have or adopt a reMfion or belief in worship,
observance, practice or teaching. 1
Section 14 parallels both Article 18(1)-(2) of the ICCPR101 and Article 1(1)-(2)
of the 1981 U.N. Declaration-it is nearly identical except for the use of
97 [d. at 90.
98 [d. at 45.
99 [d. at 38,89.
100 Human Rights Act, 2004, §14 (Aust!. Cap. Terr.).
101 International.Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18(1)-(2), Dec. 19, 1966, SEN. ExEc. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 V.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter lCCPR]. Article 18 states as follows:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 1bis right
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom,
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his choice.
[d.
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gender-sensitive language.102 But the limitations on religious practice
permitted by Article 18(3) of the ICCPR were not adopted. Instead, the rights
of Section 14 can be qualified only in accordance with the Act's general
limitation provision that allows human rights to be "subject only to reasonable
limits set by Territory laws that can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."103
Although .the Consultative Committee recommended adoption of the
provision in Article 18(4) of the ICCPR which states; that parents have a liberty
to "ensure the religious and moral education of. their children in.conformity
with their own convictions,,,I04 this (along with other economic and social
rights) was not adopted by the legislature for the final version of the Act. IOS
The comprehensive implementation of the language of international law in the
ACT is reinforced by providing,' in the Act's interpretation clause, that
"[iJn.ternationallaw, and the judgments of foreign and international courts and
tribunals, relevant to a human right maybe considered in interpreting the
human right.,,106
The Consultative Committee intended that this reference to international
jurisprudence should neither be compelled in all cases nor favor the decisions
of anyone court. However, the Consultative Committee did expect that the
opinions of the U.N. Human Rights Committee would provide the basis of the
relevant international jurisprudence.107 Furthermore, other ACT legislation
must also be interpreted, if possible, in ways consistent with the maintenance
of human rights. 108 This rule of interpretation is the same mandate of the
\02 Declaration on the Elimination of Au Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, art 1(1)-(2), G.A. Res. 36/55, 36th Sess., 73d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (Nov. 25, 1981)
[hereinafter 1981 U.N. Declaration}. Article 1 reads as follows:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall
include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or
belief of his choice.
Id.
103 Human Rights Act, 2004, § 28 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
104 ICCPR, supra note 101, art. 18(4); ACT REpORT, supra note 91, app. 4, at 21, app. 5, at 34, app. 6, at
25.
105
106
107
108
See generally Human Rights Act, 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
[d. § 31(1).
See ACT REPORT, supra note 91, at 92-93.
Human Rights Act, 2004, § 30 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
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statutory bills of rights in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. 109 In relation
to the religious freedoms of· Article 18 of the' ICCPR, the. Consultative
Committee also referred to the 1981 U.N. Declaration as an additional
interpretational aid for what was to become Section 14.110
When it came to the means of _enforcing the rights spelt out in the Human
Rights Act, once again the United Kingdom and New Zealand's experiences
were influential, especially in the way the Act deals with legislators' concerns
about preserving, if only in a legal sense, the ultimate powers of the legislature
to decide how rights should be ordered. The ACT now uses both pre-
legislative Government scrutiny of bills for compliance with the Human Rights
Act and post-legislative consideration by the Territory Supreme Court for
compliance or incompatibility with the Act. Whenever a Government bill is to
be placed before the legislature, the Attorney-General (who in Australian
polities is a Minister of the Crown who sits in the legislature) must prepare a
statement of the bill's compatibility with the Human Rights Act, and have that
bJ:ought to the legislature's attention when the bill is introduced. lll If alerted
to a bill's potential violation of rights in the Act, the legislature can still pass
the bill'"without the incompatibility having any effect on its validity.ll2
Similarly, if the Supreme Court hears a case that raises a question as to
whether a Territory law is consistent with a human right enumerated in the
Act, the Court may declare that the law is riot consistent with the human
right. l13 That declaration does not affect the validity of the law or anyone's
rights. 114 The declaration must, nevertheless, be referred to the Attorney-
General,115 who must present it to the legislature and, within six months, give a
written response to the Court's declaration.116 The purpose of these
mechanisms is to inform the legislature and the general public of laws that are
incompatible with civil and political rights in the ICCPR, to either compel
reform or to secure political justification as to why the Territory wishes to
109 Human Rights Act, 1998, § 3 (U.K.); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109, § 6
(N.Z.); Ahdar, supra note 89, at 215-16; Cumper, supra note 89, at 16-19.
110 ACT REpORT, supra note 91, app. 6, at 25.
111 Human Rights Act, 2004, § 37 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
112 [d. § 39.
113 [d. § 32(2). The Attorney-General and the Territory's Human Rights Commissioner have an
opportunity to intervene in proceedings when this happens. Id. §§ 34-36.
114 [d. § 32(3).
115 [d. § 32(4).
116 [d. § 33(2)-(3).
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maintain that law in violation of rights. As yet, there have been no judicial
'declarations of incompatibility in the ACT.
2. Victoria
The ACT model for a bill of rights served as the basis of the Charter of
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, which was passed by the Victorian
Parliament in 2005 and commenced in 2007.117 The~tate of Victoria is not
expbsed to the constitutional possibility that the federal government could
override its legislation, including the ACT. The state's reasons for recognizing
the same rights in the ICCPR included: the importance of having Victorian law
comply with Australia's international obligations, the advantage of having a
substantial body of jurisprudence imported into the State's law, and the
advantage of having the development of a bill of rights jurisprudence across
Australia that was standardized and relatively uniform, given that the ACT
Human Rights Act was already framed in the language of the ICCPR.1l8
Further, if the language of the ICCPR required updating, the method of
expressIon used in the ACT Human Rights Act would be adopted. 119 In part
because it had leamed from the ACT experience, the Victorian Consultation
Committee only recommended that a State bill of rights include civil and
political rights,120 although this was not to be taken as exhaustive of the human
rights of Victorians.121
Submissions were received from religious groups, including the Uniting
Church's Synod of Victoria and Tasmania and the Islamic Council of Victoria,
which asserted that religious freedom guarantees should be given. 122 The
Islamic Council wanted religious rights to follow the terms of Article 18 of the
ICCPR.123 As a consequence, Section 13 of the Charter also adopts the
language of Article 18(1)-(2) with only small differences in expression.124
There is also a general provision outlining as the permissible limitations on
freedoms, "reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and .
117 HUMAN RIGlITS CONSULTATION COMM.; VICf., REPORT: RIGlITS, REsPONSIBIUTIES AND RESPECf
2005, § 32 (2005) [hereinafter VIer. HUMAN RIGlITS REPORT].
lIS [d. §§ 31-32.
lI9 [d. § 32.
120 [d. §§ 27-29.
121 [d.§31.
122 [d. § 27.
123 [d. § 26.
124 See id. § 13; ICCPR, supra note 101, art. 18. The Charter of Righls and Responsibilities Act, 2006,
§ 14(2) (Viet) states "A person must not be eoerced or restrained in a way that limits his or her freedom."
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,,125democratic society based on h~man dignity, equality and freedom.
International law and the decisions of international courts and tribunals can be
used in the interpretation of the fharter' s· nghts.126 The interpretation
provisions of the Charter, like those In the ACT, where possible also require
courts to interpret other Victorian legislation in a way that is compatible with
Ch . h 127arter ng ts. .
Apart from the Charter's more powerful directive for the interpretation of
State legislation in accordance with the ifuperatives of Charter (and therefore
ICCPR) rights, it incorporates the same mechanisms for enforcement as the
ACT Human Rights Act does.12& Thus, the Charter ensures pre-legislative
scrutiny of the compatibility of other bills with the Charterl29 and provides for
the possibility that the Supreme Court of Victoria will make a declaration of
incompatibility with the Charter.130
If a declaration of incompatibility is mage, it must be tabled in both Houses
of the State Parliament. 131 The Victorian mechanisms are more refined than
the mechanisms in the ACT. Reinforcing Parliament's supremacy in questions
of the ordering of rights, it is open to the State Parliament to declare, by a
statement in an Act, that it overrides the Charter. The override only lasts for
five years, although it is renewable. 132 If there is an override provision in an
Act of Parliament, the Supreme Court cannot consider issuing a potential
declaration of incompatibility regarding that Act. 133 The Human Rights
Scrutiny Committee, in pre-legislative stages, can report independently on the
compatibility of a bill with the Charter and can make recommendations to
Parliament on the effect of any declaration of incompatibility made by the
Court, independent of the Attorney General.134
125 VICf. HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT, supra note 117. § 7(2).
126 Charter of RighiS and Responsibilities Act, 2006, § 32(2) (Viet.).
127 Id. § 32(1).
128 See Human RighiS Act, 2004, §§ 27-29 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
129 Charter of RighiS and Responsibilites Act, 2006, § 36.
130 ld. §§ 33, 37. Inferior courts must refer a question of potential incompatibility to the Supreme Court.
ld. § 33(1).
131 ld. §§ 37(5),38.
132 hit § 31(5)-(6).
133 ld. § 31(1)-(4).
134 ld. §§ 30,38(3)-(4).
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The Tasmanian Constitution Act of 1934 is the only State Constitution that
has Free Exercise and Religious Test clauses:135 Section 46 provides:
(1) Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of
religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to
every citizen.
(2) No person shall be subject to any disability, or be required to take
any oath on account of his religion or religious belief and no
religious test shall be imposed in respect of the appointment to or
holding of any public office.136
Although expressed as a general freedom of religion, Section 46 originates in
the pOlitical emancipation of Catholics in the British Empire.137 In 1830,
Tasmania's Colonial Legislative Council adopted the Roman Catholic Relief
Act of J829.138 This Act removed doubts, albeit not serious ones, as to
whether Roman Catholics could hold offices under the Crown in the colony.139
The Constitution Act of 1934 was a consolidation of legislation relating to the
government of the State, and it incorporated and modernized the provisions of
the Roman Catholic Relief Act. 140
Two points must be kept in mind regarding the Tasmanian Free·Exercise
Clause. First, the permissible limi~tions on religious freedom under the clause
regarding measures relating to "public order and morality" are extremely
broad.141 Second, Section 46 is not entrenched-it can be amended or
qualified by an ordinary act of Parliament.142 Therefore, it does not serve as a
genuine constraint on legislative power. 143 For instance, Tasmania's Anti-
Discrimination Act has very few exceptions for religious practices, and in a
number of respects, might be incompatible with religious freedom in the
State. l44 However, the invalidity of any Tasmanian anti-discrimination law is
135 Constitution Act, 1934, c.94, § 46 (Tas.).
136 [d.
137 Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7 (Eng.).
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 Constitution Act, 1934, § 46.
141 [d.
142 [d.
143 [d.
144 Reid Mortensen, A Reconstruction of Religious Freedom and Equality: Gay, Lesbian and De Facto
Rights and the Religious School in Queensland, 3QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 320,325 (2003).
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unlikely, and the Free Exercise Clause can be qualified simply by the passage
of ordinary legislation like the Anti-Discrimination Act.
II. THE ICCPRANDTHE 1981 U.N. DECLARATION IN AUSTRALIAN LAW
Australia ratified the ICCPR on August 13, 1980. The 1981 U.N.
Declaration, which stated in more detail aspects of the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, the ICCPR, and other international covenants on human
rights, was subsequently adopted by the V.N; General Assembly in November
1981, with Australia's support. This has particular significance for the
articulation of rights of religious freedom in Australia, especially at a national
level. Like other countries that inherited the structures of English law,
Australia's legal system is, in the international sense, dualist. International
legal obligations do not become municipal legal obligations anywhere in
, Australia unless the local Parliament specifically adopts international legal
bli . 145.0 gations.
However, from the early 1980s, the development of the interpretation of
. federal power has seen Australian constitutional law recognize that the Federal
Parliament has competence to pass legislation under the external affairs power
of the Constitution once an international legal obligation' arises.146
Accordingly, when (by the exercise of Crown prerogative) the federal
government makes Australia a party to a treaty or convention, the Federal
Parliament gains power to enact legislation to implement it.147 In this way, the'
Federal Parliament has entered the field of human rights and anti-
discrimination law, granting it powers it otherwise would not have. 148 Further,
it has become possible for the Federal Parliament to set national human rights
standards that override State and Territory laws that violate them. 149 It remains
145 Bradley v. Commonwealth (1973) 128 C.L.R. 557,582--83 (Austl.); Dietrich v. R. (1992) 177 c.L.R.
292,305,359-60 (Austl.); Minister for Immigration 8i EtJuiic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R 273, 286-87,
298,304,315 (Austl.).
146 See generally AUSTL. CONST. § 5l(xxix).
147 Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1, 122,218-19,259 (Austl.); Richardson v. Forestry
Comm'n (1988) 164 C.L.R. 261,295-96 (AustJ.).
148 See, e.g., Age Discrimination Act, No. 64, 2004 (Austl.); Disability Discrimination Act, No. 135, 1992
(Austl.); Sex Discrimination Act, No.4, 1984 (Austl.); Racial Discrimination Act, No. 52, 1975 (Austl.);
Soulitopoulos v. La Trobe Univ. Liberal Club (2002) 120 F.C.R. 584 (Austl.); X. v. Commonwealth (1999)
200 C.L.R. 177 (Austl.); Aldridge v. Booth (1988) 80 A.L.R. 1 (Austl.); Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982)
153 c.L.R. 168 (Austl.).
149 See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland (1988) 166 CLR. 186 (Austl.); Viskauskas V. Niland (1983) 153
C.L.R. 280 (Austl.); Koowarta, (1982) 153 C.L.R. at 168.
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unclear to what extent, in passing legislation, the Federal Parliament can rely
.on an international instrument, like a U.N. declaration, that does not itself
create an obligation under international law.150
A. Federal Implementation
While the federal government has slowly extended human rights through
federal anti-discrimination laws,151 it has been less enthusiastic about
sponsoring other kinds of human rights law. -The primary instrument that
guides the federal government in its implementation of human rights law is the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act of 1986.152 A weak
implementation at best, the Act establishes the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission (HREOC).153 This agency, through its
commissioners, administers federal anti-discrimination law. 154 In practice,
anti-discrimination law is the most important pre-occupation of the HREOc.155
The HREOC's other primary functions include public, education in human
rights, the examination of federal and Territory statutes for compliance with
human rights, the investigation of practices by a federal agency or in a
Territory for compliance with human rights, reporting to government on ways
of giving effect to the provisions of the ICCPR and other international
instruments, and examining the consistency of international instruments with
the ICCPR and other instruments. 156
The ICCPR has a prominent place in the scheme set out in the HREOC
Act. For example, human rights issues listed in the HREOC's investigations,
reports, and public education. programs are the same issues that are dealt with
in the ICCPR.157 The Government can also add other international instruments
to the HREOC, and on February 8, 1993, the 1981 U.N. Declaration was added
for these purposes.158
150 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1996) 187 c.L.R. 416, 509 (Austl.); Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983)
158 C.L.R. I, 171-72,258-59 (Austl.); R. v. Burgess (1936) 55 c.L.R. 608, 687 (Austl.).
151 See supra text accompanying note 145.
152 H!lman Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986 (Austl.).
153 [d. § 7.
154 [d.
155 [d.
156 See id. §§ 3(1), 11(1).
157 [d. § 3(1).
158 [d. §§ 3(1),47.
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Nothing in the HREOC Act elevates the provisions of the ICCPR or the
1981 U.N. Declaration to the status of the municipal law in Australia. 159
Instead, the HREOC recommends ways that the 'Government and Parliament
can ensure compliance with international human rights standards. In the end,
the Government and Parliament ultimately decide whether or not to comply
with these standards. In only one situation has the Federal Parliament directly
enacted provisions of the ICCPR. This action occurred when Article 17's right
of privacy-to the extent that it concerns sexual, relations between consenting
adults-was enacted in 1994, after the U.N. Human Rights Committee issued
an opinion that Tasmania's sodomy laws put Australia in breach of its
obligations under the ICCPR.160 Apart from the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, Australia has no federal religious freedom or religious
discrimination law. 161
B. Federal Reform Proposal
In 1997, Chris Sidoti, the HREOC Human Rights Commissioner, released
Free to Believe?, a discussion paper that outlined the legal status of religion in
Australia in conjunction with Australia's international obligations under the
ICCPR and the 1981 U.N. Declaration.162 Although the Commissioner's paper
dealt with Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 20's prohibition of the
advocacy of religious hatredl63 'Cdespite Australia's having made a reservation
to Article 20),164 it was principally an elaboration ofth~, 1981 U.N.
Declaration.165 Reflecting the HREOC's own institUtional focus, the paper
called for submissions on discrimination in the following areas: employment,
education and the marketplace, town planning, religious vilification, and
159 See generally id.
160 Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act, No. 179, 1994, § 4 (Austl.); see U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
COmJ1lUnication No. 488/1992: Australia 04104/94, U.N. Doc. CCPRlCl50/D/488/1992 (Apr. 4, 1994).
161 Reid Mortensen, Rendering to God and Caesar: Religion in Australian Discrimination Law, 18 U.
QUEENSL. LJ. 208, 216-17 (1995). There are protections for ethno-retigious groups under the Racial
Discrimination Act of 1975, including the federal racial vilification laws. See Racial Discrimination Act, No.
52, 1975; § 18 (Austl.). The protection of ethno-religious identity arose primarily from claims brought by
Jews. See Toben v. Jones (2003) 199 A.L.R. 1 (Austl.); Jones v. Scully (2002) 71 A.L.D. 567 (Austl.).
162 HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N [HREOC], FREE TO BELlEVE? THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BEUEF IN AUSTRAlJA: HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSION PAPER No. I, at 11-19 (1997)
[heremafter DISCUSSION PAPER 1].
163 Id.
164 Australia (with other Commonwealth countries and the United States) reserved the right not to have to
enact any measures beyond its existing legislation. See MANFRED NowAK, U,N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POUTICAL RIGHTs-CCPR COMMENTARY 479 (2d ed. 2(05).
165 DISCUSSION PAPER I,supra note 162, at 19-23.
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indigenous beliefs. 166 Freedom to Believe? distinguished itself from the 1981
U.N. Declaration because it raised no specific issue of freedom from legislative
or governmental interference with religious practice. 167
Mter more than a year in which submissions were received, the BREOC
issued its follow-up report, Article 18-Freedom of Religion and Belief
("Article 18 Reporf'), which reverted to the policy concerns of the ICCPR 168
The Commission strongly recommended that the Federal Parliament pass a
Religious Freedom Act. Although some recommendations of the HREOC
were specific to the constitutional responsibilities of the States and Territories,
the proposal largely encouraged a national law in the form of a federal
Religious Freedom Act. 169 This recominendation rested on the BREGC's
conclusion that laws in Australia did not give comprehensive protection of
religious freedom, that the available protection was weak: relative to that
available in comparable countries, and that Australia therefore "does not fully
satisfy" its obligations under the ICCPR and the 1981 U.N. Declaration.170
, I
The Article 18 Report addressed a broad range of concerns that religious
groups in Australia had in their dealing with the law, the government, and
others in the community. These concerns included the uneven protection of
tribal Aboriginal heritage (a complex question that implicates landholding,
mining and deveiopment); the special needs of Aboriginal people, Muslims,
Buddhists, and Jews in burials and when undertaking autopsies; inherited bans
on the practice'bf witchcraft and fortune-telling; and the coercive methods of
some "cults" and new religious movements. 171
In the submissions, some expressed concerns about the discrimination
inherent in the common use of Christian symbolism on public occasions, the
adoption of Christian feasts as public holidays, the denial of employment to
Jews and Seventh-Day Adventists who refused to work on Saturdays, and
religious (particularly Christian) instruction in State schools. 172 There were
specific complaints about the vilification of Christians and their symbols at gay
and lesbian festivals, of Jews from some Christian and Muslim sectors, of
Muslims in the mainstream media, and of Scientologists in the Parliament of
166 See id.
167 [d. at 25-28.
168 HREOC, ARTICLE 18: FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF iii (1988) [hereinafter ARTICLE 18 REpORT].
169 [d. at 24.
170 ld. at 23-24.
171 [d. at 27-33, 36-42, 51-52, 60-61.
172 ld. at 69-75.
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New South Wales (NSW).173 A few submissions expressed concern about the
age threshold for marriage (18 years), ~ustralia' s strict monogamy laws, blood
transfusions involving Jehovah's Wltnesses and their children and the
. 174 '
circumcision of JeWish boys. However, the HREOe made no
recommendations about these concerns. The cultural practice of female genital
"circumcision" by some Mrican groups was. explicitly rejected as deserving
.any protection as a religious practice, and a tightening of legislative bans was
recommended. 175
The proposed Federal Religious Freedom Act was to include a national
guarantee of religious freedom (as expressed in the !CCPR and the 1981 U.N.
Declaration);176 a civil prohibition on direct and indirect religious
discrimination, with exemptions where religious adherence was a genuine
-occupational qualification or necessary to give effect to a religious group's
tenets; 177 and a civil ban on expression that inCited religious hatred that
constituted incitement to discrimirIation, hostility, or violence laws in terms
similar to Article 20 of the ICCPR (despite Australia's reservation).178 The
Article 18 Report was tabled in Federal Parliament in late 1998, but in
February 1999 the Federal Attorney-General, Daryl Williams, informed
Parliament that the Government would not move to introduce the
recommended Religious Freedom Bill. 179 No reason was given for this
stance.180
In 2003, the HREOC undertook the IsmaC-Listen Pr~ject to assess the
extent to which Arab and Muslim Australians had experienced increased
001 181 Th .hostility after September 11, 2. e BREoe heard eVidence that
reported incidents of discrimination against Arab Australians had risen as
much as twenty-fold since the September 11th attacks. 182 Incidents of
discrimination were high due to the ~eightened social and interfaith tension
173 Id. at 88-93.
174 Id. at 34,36,42---45,47.
175 Id. at 58-59.
176 Id. at 24.
177 Id. at 111-12.
178 Id. al139.
179 PARL. DEB., H.R. (Feb. 9,1999) 2273 (Austl.).
180 Id.
181 HREOC, IsMAt-USTEN: NATIONAL CONSUJ,.TATIONs ON ELIMINATING PREJtJDICE AGAINST ARAB
AND MUSUM AUSTRALIANS 15-16 (2006) [hereinafter ISMAt-USTEN REpORT].
182 [d. at 43---47.
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after the Bali bombings of October 2002 and with Australia's involvement in
the invasion of Iraq in 2003.183
The Commission heard evidence of the increased abuse of, and violence
towards, Muslims in public pla~es, the open criticism and avoiding of women
who wear the hijab, and added police surveillance of Muslim men near women
(especially in Sydney, where gang-rapes of Anglo-Celtic women by Lebanese
Muslim men have helped bring interfaith and interracial tensions to serious and
violent levels).I84 However, the HREOC's legislative recommendations in the
Ismat-Listen Report were not specially tailored to the Muslim question,
which is undoubtedly one of the most urgent challenges that Australian law
encountered in the early 2000s. IrIstead, the Commission renewed its
recommendation that the Religious Freedom Act contemplated in the Article
18 Report be passed, although as the problems identified in the report
concerned social relations and not the impact of legislation, it limited its
recommendation to the implementation of religio,us discrimination and
religious hatred laws.185 The ISIIl11 t-Listen Report was released in 2004, but
the recommendations have received no response from the Government. 186
C. State and Territory Laws
Except for NSW, South Australia, and Norfolk Island, all States and self-
governing Territories have religious discriminatioq laws.187 In addition, in
Queensland, Tasmania, and Victoria, there are anti-vilification laws that make
it unlawful to incite hatred, ridicule, or contempt of a person or a group on the
ground of their religion. 188 Australian anti-discrimination and anti-vilification
laws generally create civil liability, but not criminal responsibility, where a
breach is proved. In Queensland or Victoria, if an act of religious vilification
is serious or severe, and is accompanied by a threat of injury to person or
damage to property, the act then rises to the level of a criminal offense. 189
183 Id.
184 Id. at 78-82.
185 Id. at 120-29.
186 HREOC, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, at 21 (2005).
187 Discrimination Act, 1991, § 7(1)(h) (Anstl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1992, § 19(1)(m) (N.
Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 7(i) (Queensl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, §§ 16(o)-(p) (Tas.);
Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 60) (Viet.); Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 53 (W. Austl.).
188 Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, c. 4, § 124A (Queensl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19 (Tas.);
Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 8 (Vict.).
189 Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 131A (Queensl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 25
(Viet.).
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There is no need for an international obligation to support anti-
discrimination legislation. The States and Territories have plenary powers to
enact these laws even without reference to an international instrument. In
Australia, anti-discrimination law in particular owes more to the structures of
Commonwealth and U.S. anti-discrimination law than it does to those of
international instruments. However, it is relatively common for law reform
agencies to draw on the example of international law when developing or
recommending legislation. For instance, the Queensland Anti-Discrimination
Act appeals in explicit terms to the federal government's ratification of the
ICCPR (and other conventions and declarations) .and gives the State's support
to the ratification of those instruments, before recounting that the provisions of
the Act are meant to give them effect. 190 In fact, the original religious hatred
law in the Queensland Act adapted the language of Article 20 of the ICCPR
(again despite Australia's reservation to Article 20) in making the "advocating
[ot] racial or religious hatred or hostility" so as to "incite unlawful
discrimination or another contravention of the Act" a ~riminal offense.191 No
prosecutions were brought under the provision" which is unsurprising, as
Article 20 was drafted to respond to threats akin to the violent anti-SemitisID of
National Socialism.192 The Queensland Parliament repealed this provision in
2001 and replaced it with the standard fonn of anti-vilification law, which,
unlike Article 20, does not require proof of incitement to discrimination or
violence as well as the incitement of hatred.193 .
D. South Australia and New South Wales Reform Proposals
NSW and South Australia are the only States not to. have religious
discrimination laws. In 2006, the South Australian government moved to
introduce a diluted form of religious discrimination law in a bill which, if
passed, would have made it unlawful to discriminate on the ground of
"religious appearance or dress.,,194 The bill was responding specifically to
issues like those highlighted in the Ismat-Listen Repol1 and had the support
of Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish, Scientologist, and Seventh-Day Adventist
communities. 195 However, it was withdrawn later in the year when the
190 Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991. pmb!. (Queens!.).
191 Anti-Discrimination Act. 1991. § 126 (repealed) (Queens!.). The HREOC recommended this as the
preferred formulation of a federal religious hatred law. See ARTICLE 18 REPORT, supra note 168, at 102.
192 NOWAK, supra note 164, at 468.
193 Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act, 2001, § 8 (Queens!.).
194 Equal Opportunity (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill, 2006, H.A. Bill No. 70, § 60 (S. Austl.).
195 Jeremy Roberts, Christian Pressure Kills OffBias Ban, AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 20. 2006, at 6.
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Western Christian churches along with the Greek Orthodox Church and the
Greek Evangelical Church lodged objections.1% The churches explicitly raised
serious concerns about public speech-preaching, criticism of other faiths and
evangelism197-none of which were implicated in the bill, as it did not include
anti-vilification laws, but rather only dealt with distinctions based on
appearance. It is difficult to see the churches' objection to this bill as anything
but a consequence of .the heightened sensitivity towards religious
discrimination and anti-vilification laws that has emerged across Australia in
the wake of the Catch the Fire Ministries case. 198
In NSW, Australia's most populous and pluralized State, a comprehensive
and detailed survey of the position of religion was undertaken by the State
Anti-Discrimination Board between 1978 and 1984.199 The Discrimination
and Religious Conviction Report provided the definitive account of the status
of religious groups and beliefs under Australian law in the late 1970s and early
1980s, comparable to the Article 18 Report's accou~t of the 1990s.200 The
general conclusion was the following:
.Australia has religious equality, but. it has been the kind of
equality in which some religions are more equal than others.
Religious liberty, under which religion is not a cause for either
privilege or denial, is another matter altogether. Australian
experience suggests that individual religious liberties need to be more
adequately protected by human rights and anti-discrimination
W 'legislation.
As would be recounted in the Article 18 Report, the concerns about privilege
and inequality stemmed fr01l1 the predominance of the inherited Christian
institutions202 in national and State polities, including .laws relating to
blasphemy, sacrilege and desecration, jury-service exemptions for Christian
clergy, oaths in the legal process, Sunday closing laws, prayers in Parliament
and local councils, and religious education and Christian observances in State
schools.203 The protection of Aboriginal sacred sites was also considered a
196 ld.
197 ld.
198 See infra text accompanying notes 230-62.
199 ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BOARD, N.S.W., DISCRIMINATION AND RELIGIOUS CONVICTION 3 (1984)
[hereinafter N.S.W. REPoRT].
200 ld.
201 ld. at 54.
202 ARTICLE 18 REPORT, supra note 168, at 92-102; see alsoN.S.W. REpORT, supra note 199, at 31, 42.
203 N.S.W. REPoRT, supra note 199, at 99-107, 17~74, 179-82,314-43.
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privilege, although one that the Board wanted to have reinforced?04
Discrimination and Religious Conviction dealt at length with the legal, social,
and economic difficulties confronting non-Christian minorities, whether they
belonged to established world religions or new religious movements.205 Even
in 1984, when Islam was the .largest non-Christian religion in NSW, Muslims
were reported to have encountered difficulties with government practices for
autopsies and burials; non-compliance with Halal slaughtering rites in the meat
industry; obtaining leave and even losing employment for praying at work,
Friday Mosque attendance, or observance of holy days; and refusal of rental
accommodation (because it was believed that Muslims slaughtered sheep and
goats in their Own yards).206 Buddhists, Monnons, and members of the
Unification Church met difficulties securing planning approvals for places of
worship, usually because of objections lodged by local churches?07
In crafting its recommendations in, Discrimination and Religious
Conviction, the Anti-Discrimination Board referred to the ICCPR and the 1981
U.N. Declaration.208 The Declaration, in particular, was identified as "the
'norm' against which discriminatory practices can be gauged, and on which
world opinion can focus.,,209 In conformity with these standards, the Board's
central conclusion was that the State Parliament should legislate to make it
unlawful "to discriminate on the ground of religious belief or [its] absence,"
with stated exceptions to safeguard the freedom of religious groups to
discriminate.2lO Nothing has yet happened in this respect in NSW, while other
States and the Federal Territories have, in effect, responded to these
recommendations by. passing strong religious discrimination laws.2lI NSW
itself has gradually legislated to remove many of the inherited Christian
preferences in its own law, but despite pioneering anti-discrimination law in
general in Australia, has only had its race discrimination laws amended for the
204 ld. at 96-99.
205 ld. at 191-281.
206 ld. at 119-21,355,361-62,368,376,384-85,456-62,477.
207 ld. at 226-36. Although the report did not detail similar objections about mosques, Muslims in
Sydney have commonly encountered the same difficulties. E.g. Canterbury Mun. Council v. Moslem Alawy
Soc'y (1985) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 525, 544 (N.S.W.).
208 N.S.W. REPoRT, supra note 199, at 54-60.
209 ld. at 60.
210 ld. at 508-16.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 187-93;
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protection of "ethno-religious" groupS.212 This was almost certainly already
the position under race discrimination laws, even without such clarification.213
NSW has seen an unusual and broad coalition of institutions expressing
resistance to the introduction of religions discrin;,rination laws. In 1999, the
NSW Law Reform Commission recommended that religious discrimination
laws be adopted and, as is customary, noted the example of the ICCPR and the
1981 U.N. Declaration.214 The Commission concluded that it was "perhaps
ironic, given the importance attached, both in our Constitution and in
international instruments to which Australia is a party, to protection from
religious persecution, that discrimination on the grounds of religious belief is
not covered by [the· State's anti-discrimination statute].,,215 And the
Commission believed it even more anomalous given the protection from
religious discrimination available in other States.216 However, this
recommendation was made against the submission of the Anti-Discrimination
Board itself which, in a reversal of its position in 1984, argued against
religious discrimination laws because of the difficulty of defining the term
"religion" or its derivatives "without introducing criteria which are
discriminatory in themselves.,,217 The Anglican Archdiocese of Sydney and
Christian parliamentarians also objected to the recommendation, although
largely on grounds of preserving church autonomy?18 The Government took
the recommendation no further. A bill to make religious vilification unlawful
(in terms similar to existing Queensland laws) was introduced in the Upper
House of the NSW Parliament in 2005, but was roundly defeated when the
vote was taken in 2006.219 The Catch the Fire Ministries case220 was offered
by most opponents to the bill as the reason for rejecting it.221
212 Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 4(1) (N.S.W.).
213 See supra note 157 and accompanying text
214 LAW REFORM COMM., N.S.W., REpORT 92: REVIEW OF TIIE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT, 1977, '1'13.2,
5.9,5.143 (1999).
215 ld. '15.144.
216 ld.
217 ld. '15.166 (internal citation omitted).
218 ld. '1'15.151-52; PARL. DEB., LC. (Nov. 15,2000) 9937 (N.S.W.).
219 PARL. DEB., L.C. (Sept 15,2005) 17,827 (N.S.W.).
220 See infra notes 230--62 and accompanying text.
nl .
PARL. DEB., L.C. (Mar. 1,2006) 20,776 (N.S.w.).
In 1984, the Discrimination and Religious Conviction Report had already
identified the difficulties that Musliins, along with other non·Christian
minorities, encountered when trying to find a social "fit" in Australia. These
difficulties were unfortunately exacerbated by the events of September 11th,
the Bali bombings, and the Iraq War. The passage of anti-terror laws by
Australian State parliaments through 2004 raised concerns about the
legislation's impact on Muslim communities and the need for, but ~culty in
getting, Muslim cooperation in their administration. Still, the need to learn the
lessons of the Isma t-Listen Report 'was recognized during debates about anti-
terror laws and the Iraq War,222 and ongoing reviews have shown concern
about the "profound impact" of the anti-terror laws on Muslims that includes a
growing sense of fear and alienation from other Australians.223
But of all the issues that have specifically drawn post-September 11th
Islam into legal disputes, the anti-vilification laws have provoked the most
controversy. As noted, these laws exist in three States. The Queensland and
Tasmanian laws only apply to expression by a "public act,,,224 and the
Queensland laws (which the proposed NSW laws copied) give further
concessions to freedom of expression in allowing defenses of fair report;
privileges available in defamation claims; expression for academic, artistic,
scientific, or research purposes; or for other p~rposes in the public interest
(such as public discussion and debate).225 The implied constitutional freedom
of public and political expression has also been applied as a defense in the
Queensland laws. During a federal election campaign in Queensland,
outlandish claims that Muslims were unable to live within the secular law were
published in a campaign pamphlet, and were later held to be lawful
. 226 .
expreSSIOn.
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Although the Victorian laws have similar defenses to those of
Queensland,227 they have a broader reach, claiming extraterritorial operation
222 11 PARL. DEB., H.R. (2004) 31,687 (Anstl.); 7 PARL. DEB., S. (2004) 24,299 (Austl.); 10 PARI.. DEB., S.
(2004) 26,467 (Austl.).
223 SECURITY LEGISLATION REVIEW COMM., OFFICE OF THE Arr'y-GENERAL, AUSTL., REpORT OF THE
SECURITY LEGISLATION REVIEW COMMITTEE 142, 141-46 (2006).
224 Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998 § 19 (Tas.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991 § 124A(1) (Queens!.).
225 Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991 § 124A(2).
226 Deen Y. Lamb (2001) Q.A.D.T. 20.
227 Racial and Religions Tolerance Act, 2001, § 11 (Vict.). An amendment made in 2006 states expressly
that proselytizing is allowed. [d. § 11(2).
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and application to private communications (unJess it is reasonable to expect
that the parties to the communication desired it to be heard or seen onJy by
themselves).228 These laws were introduced against exceptionally hostile
objections from Evangelical and Pent~costal churches,229 and the ftrst case to
invoke the laws only compounded religionists', profound dissatisfaction with
them. In 2004, in Islamic Council of Victoria, Inc. v. Catch the Fire
Ministries, Inc.,23o the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal upheld a
complaint of religious vilification against a Pentecostal church and two of its
pastors.231 In December 2006, the State Court of Appeal set that decision
aside, and remitted the .case to the Tribunal for rehearing.232 However, in the
meantime the Tribunal's decision against the pastors became a symbolic
political argument against religious vilifIcation laws generally and, more
tenuously, against all religious discrimination laws. The pastors had conducted
a seminar called "Insight into Islam," which would provide "tremendous
insight into Islam and the future of Australia."m Three people from the
Isfamic Council attended and took notes. The church also published articles on
Islam on its website and in a newsletter.
The evidence of what was said in the seminar was voluminous. In the
Tribunal, Judge Higgins found that one pastor made statements including that
the Qur' an promoted violence and killing and incited terrorism, that Muslims
had a plan to overrun western democracy by the use of violence and terror, and
that Muslims intended to make Australia an Islamic nation.234 It should be
emphasized that the Court of Appeal found that ~lthough other extreme claims
about Islam were made, the pastors had not made these particular
statements.235 The Tribunal also found that the newsletter suggested that
Muslim immigrants to Australia would bring rape, torture, and murder with
them and that the website ·article made claims that Islam was an inherently
228 Id. §§ 8, 12. _
229 For histories of these submissions, see JENNY STOKES, SALT SHAKERS, REUGIOUS VlLIFlCATION LAWS
IN VICTORIA-BACKGROUND TO THE LAW AND CASES (2005), available at http://www.saltshakerscorg.aulpdfJ
300269_ARTICLES_ON_VlLlFlCATION.pdf.
230 Catch the FIre Ministries, Inc. v. Islamic Council of Victoria, Inc. (Catch the Fire Ministries I) [2004)
V.C.A.T. 2510 (Vict.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulauicases/vicNCATI200412510.html.
231 Id. ']['J[ 395-96.
232 Catch the FIre Ministries, Inc. v. Islamic Council of Victoria, Inc. (Catch the Fire Ministries II) [2006]
V.S.C.A. 284, 'll'I1I4, 119, 134 (Viet.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulauicases/vicNSCA/2006/
284.html.
233 Catch the Fire Ministries I, [2004) V.C.A.T. '{34 (quoting from "Exhibit T," advertising material for
the conference).
234 Id. 'i 80.
235 Catch the Fire Ministries II, [2006] V.C.S.A. 'fI38--62.
violent religion with terrorism in its very nature?36 As a result of its findings,
the Tribunal held that the church and the pastors had incited hatred and ridicule
of Muslims. The se:rninar was "essentially hostile, demeaning and derogatory237 .
of all Muslim people," and the newsletter sought "first of all to create
fear . . . of being hanned by Muslims.,,238 No defense succeeded. The
availability to the pastors of the constitutional freedom of public and political
communication was ruled out early in the proceedings,239 and was later
dismissed by the Court of Appeal?40 In the Tribunal, Judge Higgins ordered
that the pastors make public apologies and promise not to make similar
statements in the future?41
In some Christian churches, the Trihunal decision led to mounting fear of
the effect of religious vilification laws on the legality of giving expression to
religious disagreements and on proselytism. As previously seen, the proposed
South Australian discri:rnination laws relating to religious appearance or dress
failed because churches raised concerns about their effect on evangelism.242
The private member's bill for religious vilification laws in New South Wales
met the argument that Catch the Fire Ministries was not wanted in the State?43
In June 2005, NSW Premier Bob Carr told Parliament that "the Victorian
experience" showed that religious vilification laws were too easy to abuse.244
In Victoria itself, the opposition leader, Ted Baillieu, responded to appeals
from churches (and simultaneously raised the ire of Jewish and Muslim
organizations) by promising that, if his party "secured the Government, he
would move to have the anti-vilification laws rewritten?45
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The Court of Appeal's decision in Catch the Fire Ministries could possibly
allay some of these concerns, but it is too early to m;sess whether, in a political
236 Catch the Fire Ministries I. [2004] V.C.AT. 'i'J[ 383, 391-94.
237 Id. '1383.
238 Id. 'I 392.
239 Islamic Council of Victoria, Inc. Y. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2003] V.C.A.T. 1753, '1'110-17
(Viet.) (preliminary argument), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/~aseslyicNCATI200311753.html.
240 Catch the Fire Ministries lI, [2006] V.S.C.A. at 111-13, 198-210.
24! Islamic Council of Victoria, Inc. v. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2005] V.C.A.T. 1159 (Viet)
(remedy and tribunal orders), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vicNCATI2005/I 159.html.
242 See supra teX! accompanying notes 194-98.
243 See supra text accompanying notes 213--20.
244 PARL DEB., L.A. (June 21, 2005) 17,085 (N.S.W.).
245 Rick Wallace, Jewish Fury at Baillieu Stance, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. II, 2006, at 3; Tony Koch, Rick
Wallace, Sid Marris, Ashleigh Wilson & Amanda OBrien, State ofthe Nation: The View from the Australian's
Political Writers, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 12,2006, at 31.
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sense, it will salvage the public reputation of religious vilification and religious
discrimination laws. In the Court of Appeal, the judgments of Justice Nettle
and Justice Neave, while agreeing in the result, differed in some important
respects. FOf the most part, the third judge, Justice Ashley, agreed with Justice
Neave's approach. The Court explained the religious vilification laws and
their defenses at some length. Three important aspects of the decision are
discussed here.
First, Justice Nettle believed that the Tribunal disregarded significant
aspects of the pastor's seminar that might have shown it to be more balanced
than the Tribunal concluded.246 In particular, the pastor's repeated
exhortations to show love to Muslims, in the hope of converting them to
Christianity, might have precluded the conclusion that his criticisms of Islam
were inciting others to hate Muslims.247 Justices Ashley and Neave agreed that
these statements should be taken into account in deciding whether there was
unlawful vilification,248 but warned that in some cases "the invocation to love"
may suggest merely "feigned concern" for a vilified iroup.249
Second, Justice Nettle's interpretation of the anti-vilification laws was
deeply influe~ced by considerations of religious freedom. 250 Accordingly, he
believed that the truth of any statements Was generally irrelevant to a
determination that those statements incited hatred, ridicule, or contempt.251
False statements might not have this effect, and true statements about another
religion could still incite hatred for its adherents.252 Whether the world was a
better place as a result of evangelism and whether the pastor's approach to
evangelism was offensive were largely irrelevant.253 In the end, the defense of
making statements for legitimate religious purposes would often hold when the
1 · . 254purpose was prose ytizatlOn.
Third, these characteristic aspects of religious freedom informed Justice
Nettle's conclusion that the anti-vilification laws make a distinction between
inciting "hatred of the religious beliefs of Muslims," which is lawful, and
246 Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. v. Islamic Council of Victoria, Inc. (Catch the Fire Ministries II) [2006]
v.s.C.A. 284, 'fl69-78 (Vict.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.auJauJcasesiviclVSCAJ2006l284.html.
247 Ill. '179.
248 Ill. '1'1132, 195.
249 Id. '{196.
250 Id. '134.
251 Id. '{36.
252 Id.
253 Id. '{80.
254 /d. '{90.
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less positive about the comfort of their position in. Australia since
September 11, 2001.271 Still, in 1999, this positive report on religious freedom
was largely the result of the tradition of parliamentary self-restraint and
legislative responses to secure religious equality, which the U.N.. report
characterized as Australia's "attachment to democracy, its sound democratic.
institutions," and a multicultural policy that was aimed at integration rather
than assimilation.272 .
So far as positive legislative reforms have contributed to this "unfInished
experiment,',273 the ICCPR has had much more influence than have
Washminster institutions. It has been selectively implemented through the
weak federal initiative of the HREOC Act and State and Territory religious
discrimination laws.274 Even Article 20, which Australia has no obligation to
implement, was made law for some time in Queensland, and an HREOC
recommendation to adopt it as federal law still stands.275 Typically, however,
the freedoms of Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article I of the Declaration-
which Australia is obliged to implement-have been less attractive for
adoption as legislation because they affect parliamentary power more directly
than the equalities of the former instruments. Questions of religious freedom
thus do not, even infrequently, fmd themselves posed in Australian courts.
There has been little opportunity in Australian adjudication to help articulate
the boundaries of religious freedom.
Herein lies the broader significance of the Victorian Court of Appeal's
decision in Catch the Fire Ministries, beyond the way that interfaith
disagreement should be approached and how Muslim Australians are best
qualifIed to deal with the difficult social position they fmd themselves in post-
September 11th Australia. Charlesworth's ACT Human Rights Act first
brought the freedoms of the ICCPR into Australian legislation, and in the
interests of uniformity, these are now also in place in the Victorian Charter.276
The religious freedoms of Article 18 and the 1981 U.N. Declaration can
therefore drive the interpretation of legislation in the ACT and Victoria and
place stronger procedural restrictions on the legislatures in both jurisdictions.
271 IsMAt-LISTEN REPORT, supra note 181. at 77.
272 u.N. Report, supra note 1.1105.
273 See id.1107; Thompson, supra note 2, at 32.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 152-221.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 173, 185-89.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 117-34.
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The religious vilification laws dealt with in Catch the Fire Ministries are
undoubtedly a restriction on religiously motivated speech ~d, consequently,
.on freedoms that may be protected by Article 18. Although they might still be
justified under international law as permissible limitations on these
freedoms,277 they are not necessary to give effect to Article 20 (even if
Australia were internationally obliged to do so). It is doubtful that they are a
wise intrusion on the freedoms of Articles 18. In this respect, the Victorian
religious vilification laws (before the Charter was introduced) manifest the
general problem of not having adequate constitutional or legal guarantees of
freedoms to offset some strong legal commitments to die enforcement of social
equalities.z78 Nevertheless, in Victoria the Charter could add force to a more
speech-friendly application of the anti-vilification laws than was apparent in
the Tribunal's decision in Catch the Fire Ministries. As that case predated the
commencement of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not draw on its
manda!e to interpret laws in accordance with the Charter's (and the ICCPR's)
list of human rights. But by appealing to characteristic aspects of religious
freedom as a matter of policy, Justice Nettle's judgment in Catch the Fire
Ministries may well foreshadow ways that the Charter could force stronger
recognition of the freedoms of Article 18 and the Declaration in Victorian law.
717 NowAK, supra note 164, at 478-79.
278 Nicholas Aroney suggests that religious vilification laws would probably survive judicial review
against any applicable constitutional freedoms in Australia. Nicholas Aroney, The Constitutional'(In)validity
ojReligious Vilification Laws: Implicationsjortheir Interpretation, 34 FED. L. Rev. 287, 315-16 (2006).
